CHARU MAZUMDAR
(This is in reply to a writing by Asim Chatterjee and his associates— renegades who have openly attacked the Party and the Party line —Ed. Liberation.)
From Liberation, July 1971—January 1972.
On the Pakistan question Khokan[1] and his associates have stuck to their old line. From this it appears that they have read more documents of the Soviet Party than of the Chinese Communist Party. That is why they have repeatedly and emphatically tried to prove that with aid received from a socialist country the national bourgeoisie of a semi-colony can come to power. They have propagated this Khrushchev thesis repeatedly.
In a semi-colonial country the national bourgeoisie is tied to the comprador bourgeoisie. First, the small and middle bourgeois take help from the compradors for their capital; secondly, they have to purchase raw materials for their industry from the comprador bourgeois; thirdly, they have to take help from the comprador bourgeois for the improvement and expansion of their industry; fourthly, the comprador bourgeoisie is the buyer of a big portion of their products and, taking advantage of this transaction, the comprador bourgeoisie shifts its crisis on to the shoulders of the small and middle bourgeois; fifthly, in opposing the working class, they are united with the comprador bourgeois ; sixthly, a portion of the accumulated profits of the small and middle bourgeois — which they set apart as reserve funds — is used in purchasing shares of the big industrial enterprises of the comprador bourgeoise. For these six reasons, the national bourgeoisie is the weakest class. Therefore, it is impossible for them independently to take any decision and implement it.
In their document the charge has been made that certain “unnecessary conditions have been imposed” in respect of building up the People’s Liberation Army and that the task of forming it has thus been delayed. Our People’s Liberation Army is mainly a peasant army and this army becomes strong through the peasants’ class struggle. It is the responsibility of this army to make agrarian revolution successful. To make agrarian revolution successful the leadership of the poor and landless peasants over the struggle will have to be established invariably. That is why we have said that in the matter of selection of commanders at every level, emphasis will have to be laid on poor and landless peasants, because the class struggle in rural areas is their struggle. If this is taken as a precondition, then this precondition will have to be fulfilled unhesitatingly. Not to do this will really mean denial of class struggle.
The People’s Liberation Army is a special kind of army. The speciality of this army is that each of its members has conquered the fear of death and can conduct struggle on his own initiative. That is why it is said that victory or defeat in a war is determined not by the rifle but by the man who holds it. Here lies the basic difference between the imperialist army and the People’s Army. That is why even after Magurjan and Rupaskundi[2] we have not yet been able to attack the mobile enemy force. The reason is not technical but political. It is certain that after the People’s Liberation Army is built many youths from among the poor and landless peasants will want to join this army. After they are taken into the People’s Army it will be duty of the Party to quickly educate them politically.
To build a base area we need first a permanent army and we need a politically conscious people. It is only after the two conditions are fulfilled that the question of terrain comes. The terrain-question has two aspects : one natural and the other man-made. It is possible to develop a base area in the plains; the proof of that is the fact that during the time of the anti-Japanese war seven such base areas developed in the suburbs of the city of Peking. The danger of taking shelter in the mountains is that the possibility of becoming isolated from the broad masses becomes greater. That is why if base areas are built in mountainous regions, it is the responsibility of the Party to make the peasant masses in the plains politically conscious by sending armed propaganda squads there and to cause disarray among the enemies by building more and moreguerrilla units and thus resist enemy attacks by guerrilla tactics. The importance of this is very great, because if we go to the mountainous regions the enemy’s “encirclement and suppression campaign” becomes easy. In regard to West Bengal, to proceed to build a base area in the mountainous regions means abandoning the peasants and the broad toiling masses of West Bengal and putting out the fire of armed struggle.
If these two tasks — the establishment of Revolutionary Committees under the leadership of the poor and landless peasants in rural areas and making the broad peasant masses participants in that struggle under the leadership of those Revolutionary Committees — are performed successfully, the problem of building base areas will be solved. It is in this way that base areas developed in China and in different countries of the world. It is my conviction that this method will yield good results in our country’ also; for it is our experience that in the middle of 1969 the call for building People’s Liberation Army and base area was given in Srikakulam. But this slogan did not yield good results; there were few guerrilla squads in the wide plain areas and as our entire strength was concentrated, the enemy could also concentrate his attack. As a result, we had to suffer many losses.
That is why the People’s Liberation Army is not formed merely by giving the call for it. Base areas are not developed merely by giving the call for developing them. The People’s Liberation Army will become strong and base areas will be established only when, through Revolutionary Committees, the political consciousness of the broad peasant masses is raised and they are enthused to participate in armed struggle. That is why Chairman has said :
“What is a true bastion ? It is the masses, the millions upon millions of people who genuinely and sincerely support the revolution. That is the real iron bastion which is impossible, and absolutely impossible, for any force on earth to smash. The counter-revolution cannot smash us; on the contrary, we shall smash it. Rallying millions upon millions of people round the revolutionary government and expanding our revolutionary war, we shall wipe out all counter-revolution and take over the whole of China.”
The permanence of base areas depends on the arming of the people.
Chairman has said :
“Considering the revolutionary war as a whole, the operations of the people’s guerrillas and those of the main forces of the Red Army complement each other like a man’s right arm and left arm, and if we had only the main forces of the Red Army without the people’s guerrillas, we would be like a warrior with only one arm. In concrete terms, and especially with regard to military operations, when we talk of the people in the base area as a factor, we mean that we have an armed people. That is the main reason why the enemy is afraid to approach our base area.”
August 19, 1971
Notes :
1. It was the name then assumed by Asim Chatterjee.
2. On 9 March 1971, a daring attack was made on an armed police camp at Rupaskundi in Baharagora (Singbhum district) by guerrilla comrades, and nine rifles and 105 bullets were seized.
